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Housing rents may be influenced by characteristics of nearby properties, an effect captured by 
spatial autoregression in a hedonic rent equation. We investigate the implications of spatial 
autoregression for measuring the marginal welfare effects due to a change in a residential 
amenity such as air quality. We show that if spatial price interdependence arises from 
technological spillovers, such that utility depends directly on neighboring property values, then 
the welfare change is given by the reduced form of the autoregressive model, effectively 
applying a “spatial multiplier” to the relevant implicit price. If instead spatial interdependence 
arises from merely pecuniary spillovers, as is commonly supposed in motivating spatial 
autoregression, then no spatial multiplier on implicit prices is called for in computing welfare; 
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Spatial Hedonics and the Willingness to Pay for Residential Amenities 
 




  It has long been known that residential property values or rental prices depend on 
prevailing levels of residential amenities or local public goods and that under certain 
circumstances, that dependence provides a way to measure households’ willingness to pay for 
such amenities or public goods. Pioneering studies focused on air pollution, for example Ridker 
and Henning (1967) and Freeman (1974).
1 The basic idea is that in competitive equilibrium, 
individuals equate their marginal willingness to pay to the marginal price of the amenity that 
they face in the market, which can be measured through hedonic price techniques (Rosen, 1974). 
  It is also known that housing values are influenced not only by the characteristics of the 
house in question but by those of the surrounding neighborhood (Can, 1992). Moreover, some 
characteristics are not readily observed, but their influences may be captured using spatial-
econometric techniques. Among these techniques is the use of “spatial lags”, also known as 
spatial autoregression, in which the prices or characteristics of neighboring properties are 
explicitly included in hedonic regressions (Anselin, 2002). Using spatially-lagged prices is 
particularly compelling if neighboring prices are thought to include information on elusive 
variables like neighborhood quality for which no observable measures can be compiled (Dubin, 
1988). For example, the common practice of using “comparables” in real-estate appraisal can be 
generalized into a spatially-autoregressive hedonic equation (Pace and Gilley, 1998). Case 
(1991) discusses the distinction between spatial autoregression and other forms of spatial 
dependence in housing data. 
  Recent work has shown how spatial econometrics can be applied to a housing-value 
hedonic equation that includes air pollution variables. Kim, Phipps, and Anselin (2003) —  
hereafter KPA — accomplish this using a spatial lag model, in which the value of a given house 
is affected by the values of neighboring houses. They note that the full marginal value of an 
improvement in air quality is then given by a reduced form equation that, in effect, applies a 
                                                 
1 See Freeman (1993), Smith and Huang (1995), and Chay and Greenstone (2005) for summaries of more recent 
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“spatial multiplier” to the direct effect of air pollution on property values. The multiplier 
incorporates the indirect effects that occur because the property in question goes up in value, 
thereby raising the value of surrounding properties, whose improved values in turn raise the 
value of the property in question. 
  It turns out that the combined direct and indirect effect is quite well estimated in the KPA 
data by ordinary least squares (OLS). This might be viewed as something of a disappointment: 
although the more sophisticated theory is preferred by statistical tests, it makes little difference to 
marginal benefits as they measure them. But in fact, the decomposition of the total effect into 
direct and indirect components is highly informative for policy. The reason is that only under 
certain rather strong assumptions is this total marginal effect a valid guide to the aggregate 
benefits of changing the amenity in question (where benefits are defined as aggregate willingness 
to pay for the change in question
2). Under other assumptions, it is only the direct effect that is 
relevant. 
  Thus the advantage of the spatial hedonic methodology for welfare measurement may be 
less in its theoretically superior estimation properties than in its ability to take into account the 
mechanism by which the value of a property affects the values of its neighbors. The spatial lag 
specification enables the analyst to measure the size of price-related externalities and, if they are 
deemed to be merely pecuniary, to distinguish them from the amenity component of prices and 
thereby prevent them from confounding the measurement of social welfare. 
  We demonstrate this claim in the following sections by extending the simple model of 
Small (1975). That paper, like Freeman (1974), shows that under conventional assumptions, the 
benefits of a marginal improvement in air quality are correctly measured by summing (over all 
locations) the marginal price of air quality, rq, multiplied by the local change in air quality, ∆q. 
Here rq is the marginal rental price, ∂r/∂q, as measured from a hedonic price equation. Note that 
this sum need not equal the aggregate change in land values, which are affected by general-
equilibrium adjustments including relocations, migration, and changes in city size (Freeman, 
1971). The result applies only for marginal changes in air quality because nonlinearities in the 
hedonic equation may cause rq to change as air quality undergoes non-marginal changes. 
                                                 
2 The use of aggregate willingness to pay as a welfare indicator has been debated at length in the literature. The 
rationale for doing is perhaps best explained by Kaldor (1939), Hicks (1941), and Polinsky (1972). 
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  The intuition behind this earlier result is simple. The marginal price rq measures the 
annual value to the occupant of a per-unit incremental change in air quality. If the occupant is a 
renter, that value may be transferred to the property owner through higher rents, but it remains 
unchanged as a benefit. Similarly, the workings of the property market may transfer these 
benefits from one property owner to another, but again without changing them. 
  The extension of this intuition to the hedonic model with spatial lags is more complex. 
The result now depends on why the value of one property affects that of its neighbors. Suppose 
first the reason is technological externalities. For example, people may obtain utility from living 
close to wealthier people or to renters who can afford to live in higher-priced houses; or perhaps 
higher housing wealth induces better maintenance, which produces a neighborhood-amenity 
externality. In such cases, the indirect effect identified by KPA represents a true increase in 
everyone’s utility and therefore is properly included in benefits — perhaps offset by higher costs 
of providing public services. As we discuss later in detail, benefits are then measured by 
summing terms like (I-ρW)
-1rq⋅∆q, where I is the identity matrix and ρW is a matrix of spatial 
lags, i.e. a matrix of influences across properties. 
  Now suppose instead that the reason one property value affects its neighbors is the 
operation of real estate markets, as suggested for example by Anas and Eum (1984), Pace and 
Gilley (1998), and Kim, Phipps, and Anselin (2003). Buyers are unable to determine the precise 
amenities of a given location, so they use the prices of comparable nearby houses as a guide. In 
that case, the rise in surrounding property values raises the value of the property in question, but 
it does not produce any increase in the amenity value of living there. So the increased value is 
just a transfer from the purchaser; surrounding houses produce only a pecuniary externality. 
Then only the direct effect identified by KPA is part of welfare: it is measured by summing rq 
⋅∆q, just as in the simpler model. In the KPA results, this direct effect is less than half as large as 
the total effect. Thus under the assumption of only pecuniary externalities, using a model without 
spatial lags overestimates benefits, whereas the spatial-lag model identifies the correct measure. 
We suggest that this is an important contribution of the spatial lag model for hedonic property-
value estimation 
  Our strategy is to proceed with the example of a change in air quality and decompose its 
impact into technological and merely pecuniary effects. We first do this within the traditional 
analysis (i.e., with no spatial lags), where the decomposition is not very interesting because the     Small & Steimetz, Spatial Hedonics 
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pecuniary effects cancel out upon aggregation. We then apply the same idea in the spatial-lag 
analysis. 
  In order to focus on the issue of interpreting results for a spatially lagged dependent 
variable, we assume that is the only spatial phenomenon present. Thus we assume that no 
spatially lagged independent variables enter the specification. We also choose an application in 
which the additional econometric complication of spatial autocorrelation in the error term is 




Traditional Hedonic Analysis 
 
  We first consider the case where there is no spatial interaction among housing prices. 
Consider a metropolitan area with residential locations indexed by i. Let qi(θ) measure the air 
quality associated with location i, which depends on some index of overall pollution-abatement 
measures, θ (taken to be a scalar for expositional simplicity). We assume that dqi/dθ >0. The 
rental price of a residence at i is ri=r (xi,qi) where xi is a vector of characteristics of that residence 
and r(⋅) is a hedonic rent function. Assuming air quality is considered desirable by everyone, the 
rent gradient with respect to it, rqi≡∂ri/∂qi ≡ ∂r(xi,qi)/∂qi, is everywhere positive. Landlords in the 
area receive rental revenues R≡∑
i
i i q x r ) , (.
4 
  Residents derive utility from a numeraire good z, housing characteristics, and air quality. 
Thus when deciding where to live, a resident i with income yi maximizes utility ui(z,x,q) subject 
to budget constraint z+r(x,q)=yi. Consumers need not have identical utility functions. Assuming 
that a continuum of values of x and q are available in the market, we can represent this decision 
process as: 
 
                                                 
3 Kelejian and Prucha (1998) provide a general estimation procedure when both spatial autocorrelation and spatial 
lags are present. Greenbaum (2002) provides an example where the two can be distinguished econometrically. 
4 If houses are owner-occupied, ri is the implicit rental value of the residence, paid by the household (in its role as 
consumer) to itself (in its role as property owner). See, for example, Mills and Hamilton (1994), pp. 199-206. 
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Assuming an interior solution, one of the first-order conditions yields: 









where uqi≡∂ui/∂q is the marginal utility of pollution for individual i and rqi≡∂ri/∂q  is the implicit 
price of pollution at the location chosen by this individual, both derivatives being evaluated at 
the solution values which we denote (zi,xi,qi,λi). The properties of Lagrangian multipliers imply 
that λi is the marginal utility of income. Equation (2) shows that residents will choose a location 
where the marginal amenity value of pollution just equals its implicit marginal price. Inserting 
the full solution to (1) into the utility function yields indirect utility Vi, a function of yi, θ, and all 
the parameters of the rent function r(⋅). 
  How much would residents and landlords be willing to pay for a marginal increase in the 
abatement parameter θ? Using (2) and recalling that qi is a function of θ, the marginal 
































where the total derivatives of Vi and ri include general-equilibrium effects arising in the land 
market. Aggregating over all residents and applying (2), 
 













θ θ  .  (4) 
 
The first term on the right-hand side of equation (4) shows the increased amenity value of the 
improvement, which we may call a technological effect because it results from the direct effect 
of pollution on utility. The second term shows the rent increase induced by the improvement, a     Small & Steimetz, Spatial Hedonics 
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pecuniary effect because it shows up as a benefit to landlords. Aggregate rents increase by the 
marginal amount: 
    







θ . (5) 
 
Therefore the rent changes, dri/dθ, cancel in the aggregate benefits to all residents and landlords: 
 





r R W B
θ
θ θ θ . (6) 
 
Equation (6) shows that the social benefit of the improvement depends only on the technological 
effects. Part or all of these benefits might be captured by landlords, but the total level of the 
benefit is unaffected by such rent adjustments.
5 
  A special case of (6) is when abatement is uniform across all locations and measured in 
the same units as air quality. We then have dqi/dθ=1 for every i, and 
 
  ∑ =
i
qi r Bθ . (7) 
 
Hedonic Analysis with Spatial Lags 
  
  We now allow for the possibility that rent at location i depends on rents at other 
locations. We do so by writing r(⋅) in (1) as 
 
  ri = r(xi, qi, r-i) (8) 
 
                                                 
5 We abstract from any cost savings that the landlord may enjoy, such as less-frequent painting or air-filter 
replacement. Equation (6) applies only to a marginal air-quality improvement, for which the effects of any induced 
relocations cancel out because of the envelope theorem applied to each household. It corresponds to the “Stage 1” 
and “Stage 2” effects described in Bartik (1988, pp. 176-177). Bartik goes on to show that with non-marginal air-
quality improvements, relocations can add further benefits (a “Stage 3” effect).     Small & Steimetz, Spatial Hedonics 
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where now we are explicit that xi and qi are characteristics of location i, and where r-i is a vector 
of rents at locations other than i. At least two reasons for such dependence can be postulated, as 
already noted, and each leads to a different result. The first is that inter-location rent dependence 
results from market imperfections, for example when a renter (or buyer) uses rents (or prices) of 
nearby houses to infer the unknown equilibrium market value of the house being purchased. 
Thus they are merely pecuniary externalities across locations, affecting utility only through the 
budget constraint. The second is that residents derive utility from living near high-value 
properties, for example because people take better care of a house that accounts for a bigger part 
of their wealth. In that case there is a technological externality across locations, affecting utility 
directly. (If every desirable trait of a neighborhood could be measured and included in the 
empirical specification, such technological spillovers could be measured explicitly; but in 
practice some are likely to be captured instead by spatial-lag effects.) We treat each of these two 




  If the dependence of ri on r-i is pecuniary, the Lagrangian problem for household utility 
maximization is the same as before, and so is condition (2). When we calculate Wiθ, the change 
in rent dri/dθ now reflects the entire process of adjustment of rents to pollution abatement, 
including the indirect effects via pollution’s influence on values of nearby locations. 
Nevertheless, the results of equations (3)-(7) still hold. 
 Most  importantly,  the partial derivative rqi entering (7) is that of the function r(⋅) in (8), 
holding the values of r-i constant. In other words, in computing aggregate benefits, one continues 
to use the implicit marginal price of pollution as measured by the fully specified hedonic model 
with spatial lags. No additional terms related to changes in prices of adjacent locations are 
necessary because they enter Wθ and Rθ with equal and opposite magnitudes, and thus cancel. 
Such terms would tend to be positive and so including them would overestimate the benefits of 
pollution abatement. 
  Furthermore, if the true rent function is (8) but one omits the spatial lags when estimating 
it, then the measured gradients rqi will most likely be overestimated in magnitude because of     Small & Steimetz, Spatial Hedonics 
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positive correlation between qi and the most influential components of r-i. Using such measured 
gradients in (7) would therefore also overestimate aggregate benefits. 
Note that the preceding analysis illustrates the importance of the spatial-hedonic 
approach rather than dismisses it. If spatial effects influence the pollution coefficient, failing to 
control for them will bias estimates on the direct effect of pollution reduction. This will, in turn, 
bias the estimates of the welfare gain from a marginal improvement in air quality. To summarize, 
spatial-hedonic methods improve welfare estimates by “purifying” them of pecuniary effects. 




  Now suppose the reason for spatial-lag effects is that residents derive utility from 
unobservable characteristics that are associated with their neighbors’ rent expenditures. For 
example, people may value the additional maintenance that is undertaken on a neighbor’s 
property when that property’s asset value, reflected in its rent, is higher. Or they may perceive 
that the prestige value of their location depends on property values in the surrounding 
neighborhood. We thus postulate that utility at i depends on a vector of neighboring rents, r-i. 
This is similar to what Brueckner (2002) calls a “spillover model” in the context of local 
governments.
6 The residential location problem is then 
 
λ , , , , i r q x zMax
−
)] , ( [ ) , , ( i i i i i r q x r z y r q x z u − − − − ⋅ + = Λ , , λ   .       ( 9 )  
 
First-order condition (2) still applies. In addition, residents choose the vector of neighboring 
property values, r-i; for example, individuals may prefer a “more prestigious” location among 
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where the derivatives with respect to r-i are vectors. This equation shows that the marginal 
amenity value obtained from each neighboring property’s rent is balanced by the increment in 
own rent required to acquire it through location choice. Note that as in virtually all hedonic 
models, we assume a sufficient number of choices that the level of each “characteristic”, 
including the value of a nearby property, can be chosen from a continuum while holding constant 
the characteristics of the house being purchased. The possible failure of this assumption is, of 
course, a limitation of hedonic analysis. 
  The marginal benefit to each resident from a change in abatement parameter θ is now a 
more complicated version of (3): 
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The first two terms on the right-hand side of (11) demonstrate two technological effects: the 
direct amenity value of improved air quality and the amenity value of technological externalities 
reflected in an increase in neighboring property values. These benefits are enjoyed at the expense 
of loss of consumption due to a pecuniary effect: namely, the total increase in rent arising both 
directly (third term) and indirectly (last term) from the change in policy. The aggregate benefit to 
residents is then given by the sum over locations of (11), which we can write after applying (2) 
and (10) as: 
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where ∂r-i/∂q-i is a vector of values of rq at neighboring locations, and where -dri/dθ denotes the 
last two terms of (11): that is, dri/dθ is the sum of direct and indirect influences of θ on ri. The 
aggregate benefit to landlords is still given by (5). So when we add the net benefit to residents 
and landlords, the last terms in (12) and (5) cancel each other, leaving: 
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In the special case of uniform abatement, where dqi/dθ = dq-i/dθ = 1 for every i, 
 





















r R W B θ θ θ .         ( 1 4 )  
 
  Equation (14) demonstrates that the welfare effect of a uniform improvement in air 
quality is now measured by including both the direct and spatially-induced indirect effects of 
changes in pollution levels on rental prices—presumably both positive when θ is increased. In 
the context of a spatial-hedonic specification with spatial lags, the appropriate welfare 
calculation will apply a “spatial multiplier” to the direct coefficient on the pollution measure. In 
other words, omitting this spatial multiplier will now yield an underestimate. 
 
Application: Kim, Phipps, and Anselin (2003) 
 
KPA develop a spatial-hedonic model to estimate the benefits of a uniform reduction in sulfur-
dioxide (SO2) levels in the metropolitan Seoul housing market. Their preferred model is a 
spatial-lag specification of the following form: 
 
  ε ρ β β + + + = r W S X r S x log l o g         ( 1 5 )  
 
where r is a vector of housing prices, S is a vector of SO2 levels (which we may view as –q), X is 
a matrix of other covariates, W is a spatial-weight matrix,  ε is an error vector, and ρ, βS, and βx 
are parameters to be estimated.
7 By convention, the diagonal elements of W are set to zero and 
the off-diagonal elements are normalized to sum to one by row. This specification is an example 
                                                 
7 Another pollution variable, measuring levels of nitrogen oxides (NOx), shows virtually no explanatory power; we 
include it among variables in X. The components of NOx undergo complex chemical reactions in which they are 
converted to each other and to photochemical oxidants such as ozone, creating a possible explanation for its small 
explanatory power. More seriously, the values of SO2 and NOx are not observed directly for each of the 78 
geographical zones used by the authors; instead they are spatially interpolated from 20 observations. As shown by 
Anselin and Lozano-Gracia (2007), such interpolation may cause the estimated coefficients to be either over- or 
under-estimated by large magnitudes (roughly a factor of two in their case, as seen in their Tables 7-8). 
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of the rent function in (8), in which xi is the i-th row of matrix X and qi is the negative of the i-th 
entry in vector S. 
  The spatial-lag specification in (15) can be expressed in reduced form, provided ρ<1, by 
solving for log(r): 
 
  () ν β ρ + − =
− Z W I r
1 log          ( 1 6 )  
 
where I is an identity matrix with dimensions equal to the number of locations, Z=[X, S] is the 
matrix of all covariates, β=(βx′, βS′)′ is the vector of their coefficients, and  () ε ρ
1 − − = W I v  is a 
vector of spatially-weighted error terms. This formulation illustrates a restriction in specifying a 
spatial lag without error autocorrelation: the explained and unexplained parts of the dependent 
variable in (16) are required to contain the same spatial transformation, (I-ρW)
-1. 
  From (16), the marginal effects on prices of a change in S is given by the matrix 
 
  ()
1 log − − ⋅ = W I
dS
r d
S ρ β          ( 1 7 )  
 
where both log(r) and S are vectors. In the case of a uniform reduction in S by amount dθ, the 
total effect on price at each location is given by the vector 
 















S S W I
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r d
1)       ( 1 8 )  
 
where 1 is a vector of ones and the last step uses the fact that the row sum of (I-ρW)
-1 is equal to 
(1-ρ)
-1 due to the row-normalization of W (see KPA, note 14, for the proof). KPA call the term in 
parentheses a “spatial multiplier.” Rewriting (18) in terms of the price itself instead of its 
logarithm, 
 
















  .         ( 1 9 )  
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This expression corresponds to the term in parentheses in (14), which reflects the direct and 
indirect price changes induced by the uniform pollution reduction. The direct effect, -βSri, 
estimates the amenity value of a marginal air-quality improvement at each location, while the 
indirect effect is -βSri multiplied by [(1-ρ)
-1-1] ≡ ρ/(1-ρ). 
  Table 1 provides a selection of KPA’s coefficient estimates from a “spatial two-stage 
least squares” (S-2SLS) regression, along with estimates from an ordinary least-squares 
regression (which does not control for spatial effects).
8 Both regressions are performed in semi-
log form. The estimate of the spatial-lag parameter ρ in the S-2SLS column implies a spatial 
multiplier of 1/(1-ρ)=2.22; for OLS, the multiplier is of course 1.0. The last row computes the 
right-hand side of (18), which differs little between the spatial-lag and OLS regressions. 
 
Table 1 
  S-2SLS OLS 
SO2 Coefficient (βS)
a -0.00651  -0.0151 
Spatial-Lag Coefficient (ρ) 0.549  0 
BS/(1-ρ)  -0.0144 -0.0151 
a Units: (millions of won)/(parts per billion); $US1≈1200 won. 
 
  KPA use (19) to calculate the marginal benefit of a uniform reduction in SO2 levels in 
Seoul. They obtain an average of US$2,333 per household (1.50 percent of average house price) 
for a 4 percent reduction in ambient SO2 concentrations (an average reduction of 1.27 parts per 
billion). The analysis in the preceding sections demonstrates, however, that the appropriate 
welfare measure depends critically on the underlying assumption about whether the spatially-
induced price effects change the amenity value of each location. If the spatial multiplier captures 
purely pecuniary externalities, then (19) overstates the benefits of a uniform air-quality 
improvement by a factor of 1/(1-ρ), or 2.22 in this case; simply using the OLS estimates would 
                                                 
8 These estimates are taken from KPA (2003), Table 2, using the robust form of S-2SLS. Each parameter estimate 
shown here is statistically significant at a significance level of 10% or less. The purpose of the S-2SLS procedure is 
to correct for endogeneity of ρWlog(r) in (15); the instruments used are WZ, one example of a procedure proposed 
by Kelejian and Prucha (1998).     Small & Steimetz, Spatial Hedonics 
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overstate the benefits by about the same amount.
9 On the other hand, if the spatial multiplier 
captures technological externalities, then (19) provides the appropriate welfare measure and 
omitting the multiplier would understate the benefits of the improvement. 
  In this particular example, the results ignoring spatial lags (OLS) predict the combined 
direct and indirect welfare effects quite closely. A similar but less close coincidence of 
predictions occurs in the study of marginal willingness to pay for ozone and particulate reduction 
in the Los Angeles region by Anselin and Lozano-Gracia (2007), even when other econometric 
complications are accounted for.
10 Of course, such a coincidence depends on the specific data 
set, and accounting for spatial lags may be important for isolating a number of factors 
influencing welfare measurements. We argue that one of the most important of these is the 





  Air quality is one residential amenity that can be valued using hedonic price techniques. 
Freeman (1974) and Small (1975) show that the marginal benefit of a uniform improvement in 
air quality is correctly measured from traditional hedonic housing-price models by simply 
summing over the “rent gradient”. The more recent development of spatial-hedonic housing-
price models, however, introduces a spatial dimension to this gradient. If there is a change that 
influences all prices simultaneously, such as a uniform pollution reduction, what role does this 
spatial dimension play in measuring the welfare effects arising from the change? 
  We demonstrate that the answer depends critically on whether these spatial effects are 
pecuniary or technological. If reduced pollution increases my neighbors’ property values, 
                                                 
9 It is common to find that OLS overstates marginal effects of variables in the presence of spatial lags. For examples 
in labor economics and public finance, see Greenbaum (2002) and Case, Rosen and Hines (1993). 
10 In Anselin and Lozano-Gracia’s model that does not account for possible endogeneity of the pollution variables 
due to interpolation, ρ is estimated to be 0.3314 (Table 4, column “LAG”). Thus the multiplier on the direct welfare 
measure is 1.50, whereas the welfare measure computed by OLS exceed the direct welfare measure by a ratio of 
1.30 in the case of ozone and 1.47 in the case of total suspended particulates (calculated form top rows of Tables 7 
and 8, columns “OLS” and “LAG Direct”). When they add controls for endogeneity of the interpolated values in the 
pollution variables, estimated ρ is 0.3266 for a multiplier of 1.49 (Table 4, column “LAG-end”); whereas the ratios 
of the welfare estimates computed without spatial lags to the direct effects computed with spatial lags is 1.39 for 
ozone and 1.40 for particulates (their Tables 7 and 8, top rows, columns “IV” and “Lag-end Direct”).     Small & Steimetz, Spatial Hedonics 
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thereby increasing the value of my house, but does not further improve the amenity value of my 
house, then the spatial effect is pecuniary and, therefore, welfare-neutral. If, on the other hand, I 
derive increased utility from my neighbors’ rise in property values, then the spatial effect is 
technological and is appropriately included in welfare analysis. In the former case, the direct 
coefficient on pollution produces the correct measure, whereas in the latter case the application 
of a “spatial multiplier” produces the correct measure. 
  We have not attempted to provide a means to determine whether spatial autocorrelation is 
caused by technological or pecuniary externalities. Presumably doing so requires data on the 
mechanism underlying the spatial price interactions. For example, data on the condition of 
neighboring houses could identify a pathway from neighboring house prices to spillover 
amenities; while data on actual transactions could identify a pathway involving price 
comparisons. Pace et al. (1998) provide an example of the latter approach, in which the authors 
also take advantage of temporal information on which transactions preceded other ones. In the 
absence of some such means of measuring the externalities directly, a researcher would have to 
rely on theoretical reasoning to decide which interpretation of hedonic results is more reasonable. 
It is because spatial-hedonic methods are capable of analyzing both cases that we argue 
their superiority over traditional hedonic methods. The spatial-autoregression model in particular 
has the advantage that it extracts information about technological spatial spillovers if they are 
present. Practitioners such as KPA make a valuable contribution in this respect by providing all 
of the essential information required for welfare analysis in the presence of either pecuniary or 
technological externalities. 
 
     Small & Steimetz, Spatial Hedonics 
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